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Abstract 
In 2016, post-truth was named word of the year. Since then a handful of texts have sought 
to further describe and explore the notion, moving beyond the initial definition given by the 
Oxford Dictionary. This paper rejects the term ‘post-truth’, in favor of propaganda; since 
post-truth tends to be utilised as an evaluative term of contemporary political public 
discourse, as articulated by specific politicians, predominantly through social media. Taking 
the field of information management as its starting point, our approach underlines the 
diachronic character of persuasion efforts through information management, understood as 
propaganda in the public sphere. As a notion, propaganda, in contrast to post-truth, 
encapsulates both the diachronic character of information management in the public sphere 
and the ground-breaking transformation of the process of personal opinion expression, 
initially described by the spiral of silence model, through the emergence of new interactive 
media.  
The role of information management in modern societies 
Information is a reference point for contemporary societies (Poster 1990: 7). In 
quantitative (technical) terms, information constitutes the “quantitative measure of 
communication exchange”. Thus information is whatever can be encoded and transmitted 
through a channel connecting a sender and a receiver, regardless of its content (Roszak 
1986: 11; Stonier in Webster 2006: 26). In qualitative (social) terms, information is “one or 
more statements and/or facts perceived by a human being and having a certain value for the 
receiver” (Cox 2013: 61). Information is produced as the transmittable form of a message, 
while at the same time, the values contained in this message shape the information in 
social/qualitative terms (Losee 1988).  
Information is at the epicenter of social structure (Bell 1978; Schiller 1984; Poster 1990; 
Castells 2004), since it conquers time and space; initially through its, mainly 
unilateral/analogue, broadcast and more recently through its -multilateral/interactive- 
digital dissemination (Terranova 2004), thus constituting a fundamental ingredient of 
contemporary political, cultural and financial activities. Contemporary Western societies are 
‘information societies’, since their information structures have become the basic sources of 
productivity and power. Instead of the commercialisation of information, we now encounter 
the informationalisation of commercialisation (Demertzis 2017:14). This is the result of the 
orientation of financial activity with respect to immaterial symbolic commodities (Lash & 
Urry 1996: 204-210) and new technological achievements (such as digital information 
networks) (Gleick 2011). 
The most prevalent cultural effect of the network society is the ability that everyone 
potentially now has for customised interaction and access to information production and 
dissemination (Webster 2006; Tunstall 2008). Key players in this information frenzy are the 
mass media, whose values and ideology affect the public sphere (Fowler 2003). The mass 
media focus on specific issues and cultivate specific patterns of social behavior (Luhmann 
2000: 76-88). Following social constructivist accounts (Demertzis 2002; Christakis 2016:11), 
mass media have been major actors in the formation of social reality (Thompson 1999: 7; 
Burr 2006). As Postman (1985: 14) suggests: “We don’t see reality the way it is, but the way 
our languages are. Our languages are the media. The media are our metaphors. Our 
metaphors create the content of our culture.”  
Through the evolution of audiovisual electronic media (radio, television) “the conscience 
industry, hence the public opinion formation industry, has become the pacemaker of the 
socio-financial evolution of late/post-industrial societies” (Enzensberger 1981:9). 
Information management is a basic characteristic of contemporary societies; one that 
defines the elaboration and dissemination of specific information mainly from professionals 
of communication management aimed at influencing public opinion in terms of politics, 
consumption and culture, in specific ways (Kumar 2006; Webster 2006: 190).  
Especially since the outbreak of WWI (the first “total war”), political and financial elites 
have been engaged in constant processes of negotiation with the mass media, in order to 
control it and ensure that the media will promote their interests (Cull, Culbert & Welch 
2003). Due to the prevalence of the mass media in the production and dissemination of 
information (e.g. advertisements, public relations, politics, business) (Webster 2006: 168), 
information is not merely the event that takes place outside of the media that is simply 
reported by the media, but the event modified and (re)presented by the media (Mitu and 
Poulakidakos 2016).  
Following such arguments, we conceptualise information management as a vital part of 
perception management. Perception management includes attempts to influence public 
opinion to align with specific interests (Siegel 2005). Understood in this manner and in these 
contexts, information becomes a specific means of (re)orienting power structures, a means 
for (re)constructing reality (Terranova 2004: 37). In operational terms, publicly disseminated 
information that serves to influence others with respect to their beliefs and/or actions 
constitutes propaganda (Auerbach and Castronovo 2013: 6), though it is worth bearing in 
mind that not everything that is widely disseminated in public lends itself to such analysis as 
a piece of propaganda (Auerbach and Castronovo 2013: 5) 
Describing propaganda 
Propaganda is defined through the application of four interdependent principles: the 
attempt to influence people’s minds and behavior; the efficient use of mass media; the 
understanding of the psychological condition of the intended/desired audience; and the 
exploitation of socially established behavioral patterns (Bernays 1928; Jowett & O’ Donnell 
2015). Propaganda makes (intense) use of emotions, drawing on sentimental factors, and 
seeks to persuade in order to serve the aims of the propagandist through disseminating a 
certain ideology or doctrine (Taylor 2004; Marková 2008; Poulakidakos & Armenakis 2014; 
Jowett & O’ Donnell 2015). In addition, propaganda is a phenomenon adaptive to different 
social contexts (Jowett & O’ Donnell, 2015: 391); it is adaptive to the media it utilises, trying 
to take advantage of their structure and operational culture to serve its purposes (Miotto 
1953; Ellul 1973). Propaganda has been assisted in its development by the evolution of the 
media (The Economist 2016). The media form propaganda, whilst propaganda forms the 
media and modern societies (Pleios 2005). 
In the contexts outlined above, it seems important that we should aim to recognise 
propaganda for what it actually is: a communication strategy (Auerbach and Castronovo 
2013; Jowett and O’ Donnell 2015: 389) and something that forms a part of our everyday life 
(Taylor 2003: 321). The interests of those implementing propagandistic strategies may align 
or be at odds with our own. When they align, we tend not to label this as propaganda; rather 
they serve to buttress our value system, our truth. In this vein, Taylor (2003:321) argues that 
“whether we will call a piece of information propaganda or not, depends on the side we are” 
and similarly Bernays (cited in Sproule 1997: 57) asserts that “the information we believe in 
is education; the information we don’t believe in is propaganda.”   
Initially, the Catholic Church used the term propaganda in 1622 to denote the promotion 
of specific ideas (Severin & Tankard 2000). Later on, because of its massive implementation 
before and during WWI, its use by authoritarian regimes (e.g. the Nazis) and the prevalence 
of the American school of thought with respect to its description and definition, propaganda 
became closely related with dishonesty and as such acquired heavily negative connotations. 
Lies, deceit, manipulation, mind control and brainwashing have been long considered 
synonyms for propaganda (Levinson 1999: 39; Jowett & O’ Donnell 2015). In order to focus 
on the communicative/functional aspect of propaganda (Auerbach and Castronovo 2013) 
and thus to approach it as a method of public communication, we define it as a deliberate, 
mainly political, communication strategy, exercised through the dissemination of managed 
information via the mass media, aimed at influencing others with respect to their beliefs 
and/or actions. 
Propaganda and the media in the different periods of modernity1 
During the financial, political and cultural contexts of early modernity, when coercion was 
the prevalent force for the implementation of the will of the divine right power and major 
financial interests, propaganda had a restricted role, being utilised mainly during wartime 
(Taylor 2003: 87-96), implemented through the dissemination of print media (e.g. leaflets, 
early forms of Press). During that time, propaganda had a complementary role to coercion 
policies, since the use of (military) force against external and internal enemies of the 
established political and financial regimes was common practice (Thompson 1999: 91-92). 
With the emergence of liberal democracy, the utilisation of propaganda practices has vastly 
increased (Zollman 2017:1). Since modernity, the (political) elites have needed to utilise 
propaganda to legitimise their policies, with respect to a more politicised audience (Pleios 
2011: 95). The modernisation of politics, through the generalisation of political participation 
(Demertzis 2001; Christakis 2016:25) has contributed to the generalisation of propaganda. 
During modernity, an array of new media came to surface. Along with the Press, the 
emergence of cinema, radio and television (audiovisual media) gave new impetus to the 
application of propaganda across all different aspects of social activity. Cinema was widely 
used to propagate national, social and financial messages (McQuail 2010). Radio was 
                                                          
1
 As a socio-historical condition, modernity engulfs internal evolutions and discontinuities. The division of the 
different periods of modernity and late/post-modernity (early modernity, modernity, late/post-modernity) is 
subjected to wide debate among scholars. Hence, there are different periodisations of the post-traditional, post-
medieval, period of modernity (see Harvey 1990; Hall and Gieben 1992). 
similarly used for propagandistic purposes. Radio and related technological breakthroughs 
formed a new sphere of culture and entertainment, and thus practices and models of 
propaganda (Pleios 2005). The emergence of television and the gradual creation of a wide 
variety of entertainment and news programmes led to the radical development of new 
propagandistic strategies (Ramonet 2001: 142-143; Curtis 2003: 379; Keyes 2004: 176-177; 
McQuail in Curran-Gurevitch 2011). 
The audiovisual media (cinema, radio, television) of the 20th century disseminated 
information in a unilateral way -their discourse was an “unanswered” one (Poster 1995: 17), 
a “language of command” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1986). Their “grammar” enabled 
political and financial elites to control the content (Hanretty 2011: 46, 15-17), form the 
necessary conditions for the exercise of propaganda -aimed at imposing a top-down control 
of the public sphere (Habermas 1984: 372)- and widen the reach of propaganda messages 
(Jowett & O’ Donnell, 2015: 391).   
Towards the end of the 20th century, a technological revolution occurred with the 
communication technologies as its epicenter (Castells 2000: 1). The internet is the epitome 
of this information revolution. The new types of information flow and their personalised 
reception (Jowett & O’ Donnell, 2015: 391) has influenced the rationale for propaganda 
within this new informational space. The disaggregation of audiences alongside the 
complexity as to how content circulates via digital media has created new communication 
conditions (Nerone 2015). In the multifaceted web universe, propagandistic information 
cannot totally undermine opposing messages (McNair 2006: 9). In contrast to the 
“propaganda-exclusive” media of modernity, the late-modern internet is a “propaganda-
inclusive” medium. In this sense, it encompasses the production and dissemination of 
multiple (propagandistic) messages/opinions, within a single but not homogeneous 
communication space (Soules 2015: 220), from various actors though not necessarily 
through a hierarchical, top-down rationale (from the elites to the people).  
In the contemporary digital world, the internet’s interactive character and the increased 
expression of personal subjective opinions, lead to an increase in the level of subjective 
interpretation concerning the financial, political and cultural aspects of society (The 
Economist 2016; Uberti 2017; Martin 2017), a tendency towards a “democratization” of 
communication (Bauman 1997; Kumar 2005). To use Niklas Luhmann’s sociological 
terminology, society and internet technology systems are ‘structurally coupled’ and 
‘interpenetrate each other’ reflexively, in this mutual dynamic process of co‐construction 
and co‐evolution (Demertzis and Tsekeris 2018:1). 
The participation of multiple -literally millions of- channels, websites, and social media 
feeds (Harsin, 2014) in the online communication and information “ecology”, in which any 
single user can openly express her/his own opinion on something (Gillmor 2004, Martin 
2017) and send it to hundreds, thousands, even millions of others almost instantaneously 
(Jowett & O’ Donnell, 2015: 394), facilitates propaganda (Martin 2017). 
Within this communication context, managed information, especially that intended to 
deceive, is one of the most prominent problematic issues (Weber 1995: 105; The Economist 
2016; Uberti 2017). The difficulties of verifying information sources, alongside the 
widespread expression of personal opinions, suggests a new propaganda model, that is 
expressed mainly through personal opinions, which seeks to spread as widely as possible 
(Poulakidakos 2014). Within the contexts, definitions and rationales outlined above, we are 
going to examine the notion of “post-truth” and suggest that it actually constitutes 
propaganda, since it combines diachronically exercised -by various actors- persuasion efforts 
in the public sphere and the adaptation of these efforts to the particular characteristics of 
the contemporary communication context.  
Post-truth or propaganda? 
The use of the term “post-truth” increased by around 2,000% in 2016, compared to the 
year before. This spike in the usage of the term took place “in the context of the EU 
referendum in the United Kingdom and the presidential election in the United States” (Flood 
2016; McComiskey 2017: 3; Speed and Mannion 2017). Since then, it has been closely 
associated with specific political figures, such as Donald Trump, Nigel Farage, Recep 
Erdogan, and Vladimir Putin (Stratford 2017), signifying a rather negative trend in politics. 
This sudden and dramatic increase in the articulation of the term in the public sphere, as 
well as its strongly negative connotations (Rabin-Havt and Media Matters for America 2016) 
are reminiscent of the similar outbreak of discussion and predominantly negative 
approaches concerning propaganda in the aftermath of WWI (Demertzis 2001: 28; Nimmo 
and Sanders 1981). 
‘Post-truth’ is defined by the Oxford dictionary as an adjective “relating to, or denoting 
circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than 
appeals to emotion and personal belief” (Flood 2016, Hodges 2017, McComiskey 2017: 5). 
Although the term ‘‘post-truth’’ may have a recent pedigree, there is nothing at all new 
about populist discourse (Powell 2017) misinformation and even outright lies (Ball 2017), all 
of which feature as constituent “parts” of propagandistic discourse. If there is anything new 
with respect to this issue, it is the exponentially growing influence of the internet, more 
specifically of social media and the World Wide Web (Rowe and Alexander 2017: 179). 
With respect to its journalistic dimension, post-truth describes articles which constitute 
an assemblage of facts, information, rumors, statements, rumors of statements, and 
officials’ estimations and predictions of the future. Hence, post-truth signifies the existence 
of various degrees of truth (Triandafyllou 2017, Berghel 2017) that emerge and are shaped 
either by the intentions of journalists or by the institutional “pressure” exercised on 
journalists by media organisations (Zollman 2017). Similarly, in post-truth politics, truth is of 
secondary importance. Feelings, not facts, are what matter in this sort of campaigning (The 
Economist 2016). In the post-truth world, language becomes purely strategic, without 
reference to anything other than itself (McComiskey 2017: 8); ethos and pathos function at 
the expense of logos, and become effective sources of arguments, since logos is actually 
denigrated (McComiskey 2017: 10-11, 20). This post-truth approach is directly equivalent to 
the approaches of propaganda. It describes an attempt to strategically influence public 
opinion in favor of that desired by the producer and disseminator of managed information. 
Doing so through the use of specific discursive practices (opinions over facts, emotions over 
rationalism, half-truth or even lies - e.g. fake news (Harsin 2015; Oremus 2016; Hofseth 
2017; Berghel 2017)) instead of research, rumors instead of cross-checked information. 
These practices are not at all new in the articulation of public discourse and the 
diachronic attempts of propagandists to influence public opinion (Keyes 2004; Soules 2015: 
208-210; Corner 2017: 1100; Lilleker 2017; Rowe and Alexander 2017). As illustrated by the 
previous theoretical discussion, propaganda - the attempt to influence the opinion and 
behavior of the public, through the management of publicly disseminated information - is a 
strategy used by several actors (political or not) since ancient times and in a systematic way, 
at least since the early 20th century (Taylor 2003).  
 
Propaganda is closely connected to the century-long development of professional 
political communication which, as a response to the modernisation of politics, has, in both 
democratic and totalitarian regimes, conceived of the mass of citizens  as risks to be 
managed (Keyes 2004; Harsin 2006; Harsin 2015: 331). As with propaganda, which due to its 
historical use by totalitarian regimes acquired negative connotations, the term post-truth 
incorporates an inherent negativism, due to its emergence in the public sphere following the 
propagandistic campaigns of Trump and those political representatives that campaigned for 
Brexit. Hence, the very use of the term post-truth - as with that of its predecessor, 
propaganda- has been propagandistic in nature. This foregrounds the need to always bear in 
mind that the term propaganda and its contemporary equivalent, post-truth, denote a 
struggle between ideologically different sides for the hearts and minds of the people (Snow 
and Taylor 2009). 
These similarities, discussed above, as to the definitions and descriptions of “post-truth” 
and “propaganda” lead us to the conclusion that ” in its predominantly political 
implementation, when utilised in order to influence specific social groups, “post-truth”, , is 
actually propaganda, for two main reasons. Firstly, the term “post-truth” signifies a 
distantiation between the current public communication contexts and the truth, in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms, while also implying at the same time, that in past periods 
or social contexts truth was the prevalent or even the only trend in public communication 
(Powell 2017: 724). This contradicts scientific and real-life evidence (some of which research 
has been briefly presented in this paper) that the broadcast and dissemination of managed 
information in the public sphere has been a widely used method of influence, exercised -
with different qualitative and quantitative parameters- diachronically and systematically, at 
least since early 20th century. Secondly, the “democratisation” of communication, especially 
with the emergence of social media, has enabled every internet user to express his or her 
own opinion on any given issue. This quantitative pluralism makes it possible for the 
information circulating the web to be committed to a wide range of political ideologies, 
religions and cults, conspiracy theories, art movements etc (Pleios 2011:156). Within such a 
communication context, propaganda functions not only as a top-down procedure, a 
communication strategy directed from the elites to the masses, but rather as a mix of top-
down and grassroots (between users) dissemination of managed or personal-subjective 
information (Auerbach and Castronovo 2013:9), while still having as its central aim to 
influence the perceptions of various publics on certain issues of public interest. This happens 
due to the fact that people tend both to believe that which already fits with their ideological 
orientation (Triandafyllou 2017), and to share their opinions either with people they agree 
with (McComiskey 2017), or with people they seek to influence.  
In other words, propaganda, as well as operating through traditional unilateral 
communication channels, is nowadays exercised within the digital, decentralised, not 
exclusively hierarchical regarding production and dissemination of information context of 
the internet, especially that of social media. In this respect, the social media communication 
context actually operationalises more so than ever before, Philip Taylor’s claim that “we are 
all in fact propagandists to varying degrees, just as we are all victims of propaganda” (Taylor 
2003:2).  
This emerging “democratisation” of communication, alongside the increased expression 
of personal subjective opinions, has influenced both inter-personal and mass 
communication. It has transformed possibilities such that each individual can decide to 
openly express her/his opinion on a given issue. In what follows below the transformation of 
Noell-Numann’s (1974) theory of the spiral of silence, which explores the reasons behind 
public participation and non-participation in mass communication, brought about in 
significant part by the interactive communication context of the internet and the social 
media, is explored.   
 
The transformation of the spiral of silence 
 
The dissemination of information through online media has changed the way people 
obtain information nowadays. Traditional journalism used to be the only source of 
information accessible to a large audience, but new sources have emerged as anyone can 
now provide information in a digital (quasi) public space. User-generated content (UGC) in 
the shape of blogs or on social network sites (SNS), as well as content contributed by actors 
deeply dependent on the wide dissemination of their messages (e.g. political parties, non-
governmental organisations, social institutions, companies), complements mass media 
content in both online media outlets and in legacy media such as print and electronic media 
(Porten-Cheé and Eilders 2014: 143; Fox and Warber 2015; Zerbak and Fawzi 2016). The 
quantitative expansion of content is also related to an increase in opinion diversity, since 
every additional user-generated item may present a unique perspective not yet provided or 
addressed by the mass media (Gerhards and Schäfer 2010; Dylko and McCluskey 2012). The 
more easily people can put together distinct media diets through such opportunities, the 
more likely they are to find opinions that match their own perspectives, and they may even 
lose touch with the issues and opinions being discussed by society at large (Porten-Cheé and 
Eilders 2014: 143).  
The emergence of the internet has brought about an interactive, non-linear, non-
pyramidal (non-hierarchical) communication process. The “atomised” and “democratised” 
(in quantitative terms) internet communication context and the multiplicity of information 
media has resulted in an increase in the expression of personal, subjective opinions and 
interpretations of reality. Opinion expression is central to social interactions on social media: 
certain attributes of a post for instance, can encourage or discourage further participation 
and expressions of opinion (Pang et al. 2016: 898). 
The causal relation between exposure to particular media content and opinion 
expression in public is the theoretical backbone of the concept of the spiral of silence, put 
forward by Noelle-Neumann (1974) in her theory of public opinion. According to the spiral of 
silence, the perception of the opinion climate guides people’s communicative behavior in 
the public sphere (Noelle-Neumann 1974; Miyata, Yamamoto and Ogawa 2015; Luo et al. 
2016; Liu, Rui and Cui 2017). The spiral of silence theory proposes that individuals are likely 
to speak out in public if they perceive themselves to be in the present or future majority on 
an issue. In a complementary fashion, when they perceive themselves to belong to the 
minority, people - afraid of being socially isolated - are much less likely to express their 
opinion openly. In order to assess the climate of opinion, people closely monitor their social 
environment via the mass media. Since the opinion perceived as a majority opinion is 
expressed in public and the opinion perceived as a minority opinion is not expressed in 
public, a spiraling process is initiated, in which the alleged majority opinion gains ground and 
the alleged minority opinion loses ground (Gearhat and Zhang 2014; Fox and Warber 2015; 
Soffer and Gordoni 2018). The spiral of silence mechanism explains how micro-level 
individual behavior, such as speaking out in public under particular conditions, might spill 
over to the macro-level of public opinion formation (Porten-Cheé and Eilders 2014: 144).  
The spiral of silence and the “democratisation” of communication do not refer to the 
same communication “level”. The former focuses on an internal decision making process 
conducted by a person before deciding whether she/he is going to openly express her 
opinion, while the latter describes a media context containing a multiplicity of openly 
expressed opinions. These two “dimensions”, though, are closely connected, since mass 
media content has an inevitable effect on people’s perception of the opinion climate 
(Porten-Cheé and Eilders 2014: 144).  
Especially in the personalised communication context of social media, where the 
personal is interwoven with the public more than ever before, an individual’s assessment as 
to whether she/he should express her/his opinion in public is more important than ever. On 
the one hand, we encounter a constant even instant application of the internal decision-
making procedure of the spiral of silence model. However, on the other hand, due to the 
wide variety of interests and opinions publicly expressed, the individual usually does not feel 
the same level of “oppression” by the dominant majority opinion, as she/he will probably 
find other people with similar beliefs, opinions and interpretations to their own. Thus, each 
individual undertakes the decision-making procedure described by the spiral of silence, 
without - in most cases - having the same level of fear of possible social exclusion, the main 
negative consequence described by the spiral of silence. The opinion-inclusive ecology of the 
internet and social media diminish the fear of social exclusion and thus serves to release the 
self-expressing potential of individuals online. 
 
Thus, with respect to more (quantitatively) pluralistic communication environments, 
where a greater variety of publicly expressed opinions can be found, the spiral of silence 
dynamic is “reduced”. In more “traditional”, centrally controlled, communication 
environments with one-way, top-down information broadcast, a lesser range of opinions, 
sometimes limited to a single opinion, are available in the public sphere, thus negatively 
influencing the likely public expression of a wider range of opinion. In this way, propaganda, 
especially online, is considerably influenced by the “democratisation” of communication, 
serving to diminish  the censoring effect of the spiral of silence.  
Among the most characteristic examples of this “weakening” of the dynamics of the 
spiral of silence, within the interactive communication environment, is the open discussion 
and wide dissemination of conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories are appealing because 
they offer simple explanations for complex phenomena -especially in times of social unrest 
(van Prooijen and Douglas 2017)-, or because they let people believe they are in possession 
of secret knowledge that the powerful wish to suppress (The Data Team 2017). Conspiracy 
theories are not restricted to the online world (van Prooijen and Douglas 2017) and their 
online dissemination is as old as the internet itself: the crash of TWA Flight 800 in 1996 
sparked numerous alternative accounts of the plane’s demise and the attack on the World 
Trade Center in 2001 marked a milestone in terms of the development and widespread 
dissemination of unproven rumors with respect to speculation as to the perpetrators of the 
attack. More recently, the chemtrails theory, the anti-vaccination movement and the flat-
earth theory, due to their expansive discussion in online communities (Bratich 2004; Clarke 
2007; The Data Team 2017; Pappas 2018; Yenko 2018), have even hit the mainstream 
media, and in several cases have been transformed into offline activities2.  
It is also the case that, the internet and more specifically social media, has repeatedly 
served as a means for organising and communicating with respect to grass-roots social 
movements, which oppose mainstream elite political discourse. During the uprisings across 
the Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) in 2011, the role played by social media can be 
viewed in terms of both a battleground for information freedom and freedom of expression 
and as a coordinating mechanism for political mobilisation. The use of social media can 
facilitate efficiencies in internal organisation, or else displace the need for formal structures 
of coordination altogether (Axford 2018: 21). Of the online activism that took place across 
MENA countries in 2011, it is suggested that the use of social media greatly increased the 
ability of social movements and protesters to coordinate across borders and to link up with 
other organisations (Axford 2011). 
These examples, provided with respect to conspiracy theories and social movements -
presented here as characteristic but not exclusive examples- prove that the interactive 
communication environment and the subsequent  “democratisation” of communication 
provide the chance for the supporters of any marginal position (in terms of the ability to 
access the mainstream media) to connect with others, form communities, consolidate their 
argumentation, organise their communication strategy and disseminate their beliefs in order 
to claim their ground in the (digital) public sphere  and through doing so to  propagate their 
doctrines and try to influence wider publics. 
These examples stand as characteristic of the “both-and” rationale (Beck 2009) that 
permeates the online world, especially in the age of Web 2.0+. The fusion of different kinds 
of media traditional and new ones in the interactive digital space creates a much more 
complicated context for human communication and politics, having both positive and 
negative attributes at the same time. Living in the age of “both‐and” implies simultaneity, 
hybridity, pluralism, multiplicity, connectivity, networking, inclusiveness, cosmopolitanism, 
contingency, uncertainty and, maybe above all, ambivalence and doubt (Demertzis and 
Tsekeris 2018:4). 
Concluding remarks 
Our approach to the notion of post-truth, through consideration of conceptions  of 
information management and propaganda, illustrates that post-truth can be understood as 
propaganda exercised mainly, but not exclusively, within and adapted to the contemporary, 
interactive, multi-dimensional, communication context. Post-truth is identical to 
propaganda, since it seeks to influence public opinion using specific, diachronically 
implemented, discursive practices. It can be located, predominantly, in public political - 
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 On the 9
th
 of November 2017, 500 “flat-Earthers” assembled in North Carolina for the first annual Flat Earth 
International Conference, while data from Google Trends shows that in the past two years, searches for “flat 
earth” have more than tripled (The Data Team 2017). 
though not necessarily coming from politicians - and journalistic discourse. Coincidentally, its 
recent scrutiny can be seen as emerging from specific political communication events which, 
for us, resonate strongly with the kind of political events that originally triggered significant 
research on propaganda, about a century ago.  
Propaganda, particularly with respect to its exercise through social media and the 
internet, is intensely based on subjective interpretations of reality. Hence it may originate 
through a multiplicity of communicators within the new media communication milieu and it 
needs to stand its ground - if needed - against the immediate controls on “truthfulness” 
conducted on behalf of fact-checking organizations (Poynter 2018) and individuals. In this 
context, post-truth is a communication strategy that, at its core, remains identical to 
propaganda and - just like propaganda - seeks to adapt itself to the peculiarities and 
antagonisms of the new media communication environment, in order to retain its capacity 
for significant influence. 
What this paper suggests, is that a thorough examination of propaganda should 
endeavour to remove any positive or negative connotation and focus on the actual 
construction and dissemination of a specific discursive strategy (Taylor 2003; Auerbach and 
Costronovo 2013), through the use of any specific discursive or non-discursive practices 
aimed at influencing various publics (either offline or online). Studying what Wittgenstein 
called ‘language games’ requires; firstly a focus on the interrogation of different discursive 
constructions of truth (Hodges 2017) and, secondly, a focus on their causes and aims, since 
propaganda is not a fragmented method, but rather a constant procedure designed for the 
continuous guidance of public opinion in line with the interests of the propagandists. Under 
this rationale, it seeks to create a specific context; a perception of reality through managed 
and disseminated information (Poulakidakos 2014).  
The study of propaganda remains highly relevant and will continue to be a critical issue in 
the future. The very emergence of new terms such as ‘post-truth’ and ‘fake news’, even 
though they actually describe old phenomena, indicates the wide interest of societies in the 
study of public communication and propaganda strategies. We upload and watch, we read 
and post, we google and are spammed, becoming relays within and across these networks in 
ways that blur the distinction between the production and the consumption of information. 
To the extent that ordinary citizens are caught up by and occupy fields of mass persuasion, 
propaganda matters and will continue to matter (Auerbach and Castronovo 2013). We 
should not neglect, though, that despite the proliferation of newer technologies of 
knowledge, there still exist asymmetries in the ability to manage and disseminate 
information of public interest.   
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